In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant announced the birth of transcendental philosophy by turning to the “subject;” in the First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte launched his style of transcendental philosophy by turning to the “I”; and, finally, in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl introduces the “transcendental attitude” by turning to the transcendental subject. What is it then that characterizes the subject that transcendental philosophy in all its varied forms is, in one form or another, based on it? I want (...) to defend the thesis that it is the interpretive power of the subject that makes it a productive ground of transcendental philosophy. One implication of this claim is that the current debate about the primacy of hermeneutics over philosophy is misguided. This debate began with Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. It has been advanced by Gadamer and, to be sure, by Derrida. Hermeneutics and philosophy are not opposed; on the contrary, they relate to one another interdependently. However, because of the teleological determination of philosophy—to find the truth—it is transcendental philosophy that posits and limits the scope of hermeneutics, i.e., the interpretive powers of the subject. Another consequence of the thesis proposed is that the interdependence of transcendental philosophy and hermeneutics nullifies the ground of the debate about the question whether transcendental philosophy is inherently idealistic; it will turn out that a consequent transcendental philosophy is both idealistic and realistic. (shrink)

Physicist Percy Bridgman has been taken by Heather Douglas to be an exemplar defender of an untenable value-free ideal for science. This picture is complicated by a detailed study of Bridgman's philosophical views of the relation between science and society. The normative autonomy of science, a version of the value-free ideal, is defended. This restriction on the provenance of permissible values in science is given a basis in Bridgman's broader philosophical commitments, most importantly, his view that science is primarily an (...) individual commitment to a set of epistemic norms and values. Considerations of external moral or social values are not, on this view, intrinsic to scientific practice, though they have a broader pragmatic significance. What Bridgman takes as the proper relation between science and society is shown through analysis of his many writings on the topic and consideration of his rarely remarked upon involvement in the most problematic example of "Big Science" of his day: the atomic bomb. A reevaluation of Bridgman's views provides a unique characterization of what is at stake in the values in science debate: the normative autonomy of science. (shrink)

In this paper a symmetry argument against quantity absolutism is amended. Rather than arguing against the fundamentality of intrinsic quantities on the basis of transformations of basic quantities, a class of symmetries defined by the Π-theorem is used. This theorem is a fundamental result of dimensional analysis and shows that all unit-invariant equations which adequately represent physical systems can be put into the form of a function of dimensionless quantities. Quantity transformations that leave those dimensionless quantities invariant are empirical and (...) dynamical symmetries. The proposed symmetries of the original argument fail to be both dynamical and empirical symmetries and are open to counterexamples. The amendment of the original argument requires consideration of the relationships between quantity dimensions. The discussion raises a pertinent issue: what is the modal status of the constants of nature which figure in the laws? Two positions, constant necessitism and constant contingentism, are introduced and their relationships to absolutism and comparativism undergo preliminary investigation. It is argued that the absolutist can only reject the amended symmetry argument by accepting constant necessitism. I argue that the truth of an epistemically open empirical hypothesis would make the acceptance of constant necessitism costly: together they entail that the facts are nomically necessary. (shrink)

In this paper, I look to draw novel connections between critiques of drill and epistemic injustice by addressing the question of whether the critical scrutiny of drill constitutes an epistemic injustice. I argue that these critiques constitute two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. We see testimonial injustice in how courts and police do not give credibility to drill artists’ testimonies about the storylike nature of their songs, and these credibility deficits are based in racist stereotypes about (...) black criminality and believability. We see contributory injustice in how courts and police, through wilful ignorance, see drill music as violent and criminal rather than expressive and fictional – as drill artists do – which thwarts drill artists’ ability to contribute to shared knowledge. (shrink)

This essay was published in the September 2023 edition of Griffith Observer. It is an examination of the curious friendship between writer Aldous Huxley and astronomer Edwin Hubble and its philosophical basis: empiricism. I hope that by consideration of these two thinker''s lives and work light may be shed on each of their ideas and on the 20th century conceptions of empiricism more broadly.

I provide an account of the physical appropriate to the task of the physicalist while remaining faithful to the usage of “physical” natural to physicists. Physicalism is the thesis that everything in the world is physical, or reducible to the physical. I presuppose that some version of this position is a live epistemic possibility. The physicalist is confronted with Hempel’s dilemma: that physicalism is either false or contentless. The proposed account of the physical avoids both horns and generalizes a recent (...) proposal by Vicente (2011). My account defines physicalism as the thesis that there are no objects that cannot be described by physical quantities. A dimensional account of physical quantities is given: quantities are determined by measurement procedures. (shrink)

This dissertation draws upon historical studies of scientific practice and contemporary issues in the metaphysics and epistemology of science to account for the nature of physical quantities. My dissertation applies this integrated HPS approach to dimensional analysis—a logic for quantitative physical equations which respects the distinct dimensions of quantities (e.g. mass, length, charge). Dimensional analysis and its historical development serve both as subjects of study and as a sources for solutions to contemporary problems. The dissertation consists primarily of three related (...) papers on: (1) the methodological and metaphysical foundations of dimensional analysis, (2) the use of dimensional analysis in determining physical symmetries, (3) the use of dimensional analysis in securing metrological extension. (shrink)

A book review of _Phenomenological Approaches to Physics_ (2020) edited by H. A. Wiltsche and P. Berghofer.